【JFE】Information-based pricing in specialized lending 专业化贷款中的信息定价——杨正钰分享

科研基地组织前沿文献研读交流会，杨正钰针对 2025年发表于国际金融顶刊Journal of Financial Economics的论文Information-based pricing in specialized lending作主题汇报。

文章研究了信息不对称的银行（一家专业化银行和一家非专业化银行）之间的竞争如何影响贷款定价。两家银行均掌握有关借款人资质的“一般性”信号，并据此筛选贷款。专业化银行还掌握一项“专业化”信号，并以此作为其贷款定价的依据。这种基于私有信息的定价机制促使专业化银行更积极地竞标，从而缓解了赋予其垄断权力的信息租金效应。研究结果解释了为何专业化贷款机构提供的贷款利率较低且事后表现更佳。支持性实证证据突显了专业信息在塑造信贷市场结果中的作用。

A B S T R A C T

We study how competition between asymmetrically informed banks, one specialized and one nonspecialized, affects loan prices. Both banks possess ‘‘general’’ signals regarding the borrower’s quality, which they use to screen loans. The specialized bank also has access to a ‘‘specialized’’ signal on which it bases its loan pricing. This private information-based pricing makes the specialized bank bid more aggressively, mitigating the informational rent effect that gives it monopolistic power. Our findings explain why loans from specialized lenders feature lower interest rates and better ex post performance. Supporting empirical evidence emphasizes the role of specialized information in shaping credit market outcomes.